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Low carbon transition 
Feasibility 
A B S T R A C T   
Understanding the role of technology characteristics and the context in the diffusion of new energy technologies 
is important for assessing feasibility of climate mitigation. We examine the historical adoption of nuclear power 
as a case of a complex large scale energy technology. We conduct an event history analysis of grid connections of 
first sizable commercial nuclear power reactors in 79 countries between 1950 and 2018. We show that the 
introduction of nuclear power can largely be explained by contextual variables such as the proximity of a country 
to a major technology supplier (‘ease of diffusion’), the size of the economy, electricity demand growth, and 
energy import dependence (‘market attractiveness’). The lack of nuclear newcomers in the early 1990s can be 
explained by the lack of countries with high growth in electricity demand and sufficient capacities to build their 
first nuclear power plant, either on their own or with international help. We also find that nuclear accidents, the 
pursuit of nuclear weapons, and the advances made in competing technologies played only a minor role in 
nuclear technology failing to be established in more countries. Our analysis improves understanding of the 
feasibility of introducing contested and expensive technologies in a heterogenous world with motivations and 
capacities that differ across countries and by a patchwork of international relations. While countries with high 
state capacity or support from a major technology supplier are capable of introducing large-scale technologies 
quickly, technology diffusion to other regions might undergo significant delays due to lower motivations and 
capacities.   
1. Introduction 
Meeting climate targets requires a rapid expansion of low-carbon 
technologies [1], the feasibility of which is debated [2–4]. One way of 
exploring this feasibility has been to examine the historical adoption of 
new energy technologies in terms of growth rates, duration of transition, 
length of the formative phase, and the experience rates, metrics that can 
also be used for assessing future scenarios [5–13,42]. The literature on 
this topic has linked the speed of transition to various technology 
characteristics, such as granularity [14], complexity, and standardiza-
tion [15]. 
This approach has also been used to understand the potential of 
various technologies to mitigate climate change. There have been 
debates on the potential role of nuclear power, especially on whether it 
has grown faster or more slowly than renewables [16–18] and how its 
costs have evolved over time [19–24]. A closely related debate concerns 
the reasons for the rapid expansion of nuclear power in many national 
markets, such as Sweden [25] and France [26], and its subsequent global 
stagnation. According to an explanation rooted in the Technology 
Innovation System (TIS) concept, the roots of the decline in nuclear 
power use stem from its slowness to innovate, decreasing diversity, poor 
construction performance, the occurrence of major accidents, and the 
progress made in competing technologies, such as wind and solar power 
[27]. The same study also points out that the recent liberalization of 
electricity markets has made nuclear power uncompetitive except in 
non-liberalized markets like Russia and China [27]. 
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The various debates invoke two different explanations for the decline 
of nuclear power: i) it is being globally outcompeted by other technol-
ogies, and ii) it is unsuitable for many national markets. Despite these 
explanations being closely linked, they have fundamentally different 
implications for future low-carbon energy transitions. If nuclear power 
has inherent characteristics that make it inferior to its competitors, then 
it has little or no role to play in climate mitigation. If, on the other hand, 
the liberalization of electricity markets does stand in its way, nuclear 
power can still retain its role in climate mitigation scenarios where 
electricity markets are regulated. Furthermore, the very presence of 
niche markets and newcomers [28,29] points to another competing 
theory as to why nuclear power has stagnated. It was not that the 
technology ran into any insurmountable problems: it simply ran out of 
markets in which to flourish. In support of this explanation, Jewell [30] 
and Cherp et al. [31] argue that the growth of nuclear power requires 
high growth in electricity demand, while Johnstone and Stirling [21] 
point out that the divergence of nuclear trajectories can be better 
explained by some of the features of political systems rather than by the 
internal characteristics of the nuclear power sector. This explanation 
also has implications for future low-carbon energy transitions: if in the 
future there is an increase in the number of suitable national markets (e. 
g., with high growth in electricity demand and high national and in-
ternational capacity), nuclear power could be introduced into new 
countries and play a significant role in climate mitigation. 
To contribute to this debate, we seek to conceptually disentangle the 
effect of technology characteristics from the effect of the socio-economic 
context surrounding the diffusion of nuclear power. We hark back to the 
pioneering scholarship of Zvi Griliches [32] who identified two key 
contextual factors shaping technology adoption: market attractiveness 
and ease of diffusion. This early work has not been systematically fol-
lowed up in the recent literature on technology diffusion, possibly 
because it requires the focus to be shifted from technology innovation 
and socio-technical systems to other (techno-economic and political) 
societal systems in which new technologies are embedded. This, in turn, 
calls for engagement with research areas other than technology diffusion 
studies [33]. On the other hand, comparative studies of political science 
and economic history have extensively documented the effect of socio- 
economic and political factors on the globally unequal adoption of nu-
clear power [34–38] and its competitors [39], but have failed to reach a 
consensus on how these effects can be generalized (see Bourcet [40] on 
renewables). We believe that just as the shortcomings of technology 
diffusion studies can be remedied by more systematic attention to 
contextual factors, so the shortcomings of the comparative studies can 
be overcome by more systematic attention to technology diffusion 
theories and in particular to the phases of the technology lifecycle 
[41,42]. 
To explain the dynamics of nuclear power, taking into account both 
its technological characteristics and the characteristics of the receiving 
context, we ask why the ascent of nuclear power stalled. We test two 
main explanations. The technology explanation: that nuclear power 
stalled because it was taken over by competitors and was prone to ac-
cidents, and the contextual explanation: that nuclear power stalled 
because it ran out of sufficiently attractive markets where it could easily 
diffuse. In other words, the number of countries with both the capacity 
and the motivation to introduce nuclear power declined over time. 
In our analysis we follow Markard et al. [27] who focus on a specific 
phase of the nuclear power technology lifecycle. In contrast to Markard 
et al. [27], however, we focus not on whether and why nuclear power 
has recently been declining, but rather what factors limited its use in the 
first place to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD), the former Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(COMECON), and what has later become known as G20 countries. By 
studying the historic ascent of nuclear power, we identify the factors 
that have determined whether, and how early, a particular country 
would introduce nuclear power. 
The study of the ascent of nuclear power requires us to focus on the 
formative phase of the technology lifecycle in individual countries. As 
an indicator for successful completion of the formative phase we use the 
occurrence and the time of the grid connection of the first sizable 
commercial nuclear reactor in 79 countries with a sufficiently large 
electricity grid over 70 years (1950–2018). We thus combine an analysis 
of technological characteristics with an analysis of the characteristics of 
the national and international contexts (i.e., those that facilitated or 
hindered technology diffusion). Overall, we find that contextual char-
acteristics such as demand growth, the size of the economy, import 
dependence, and foreign policy alignment are more robust explanations 
for the historical trends of nuclear technology introduction than 
technology-specific characteristics, such as major accidents, global 
experience with nuclear technology, pursuit of nuclear weapons, or 
advances in competing technologies. This knowledge is critical for un-
derstanding the prospects not only of nuclear power, but also of other 
’market-anchored’ [43] low-carbon technologies which need to diffuse 
from their ‘core’ in industrialized countries of the OECD to other 
regions. 
In Section 2, we systematically identify the mechanisms operating at 
the formative phase of nuclear power uptake and propose a framework 
for comparing these across countries and over time. Section 3 explains 
the method and Section 4 contains the results of the statistical analysis of 
Fig. 1. Mechanisms of the formative phase of national nuclear power sectors and hypotheses used in the analysis.  
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the timing of the connection of the first (sizable) reactor to the grid using 
logistic regression. In Sections 5 and 6, we interpret the findings of this 
analysis in terms of the patterns of global diffusion of nuclear power and 
propose an explanation of why this process has stagnated and what the 
future prospects of nuclear energy may be. 
2. Analytical framework and hypotheses 
2.1. Formation of national nuclear power regimes 
The uptake of a new technology both globally and in individual 
national markets follows several distinct stages of a technology lifecycle, 
commonly called the formative, growth, and maturity stages [41,44] each 
driven and constrained by their own mechanisms [8,13,41,42,44–46]. 
This means that the factors explaining the national differences in tech-
nology use could vary from one phase to another. 
In this paper, we specifically focus on the initial, formative phase of 
nuclear power uptake. At this phase, the national commitment to 
introducing nuclear power is established, the necessary institutions are 
set up, concrete design and siting plans are drawn, financing is secured, 
and domestic manufacturing, or more often overseas procurement of 
necessary equipment and expertise, is arranged. Finally, the first nuclear 
power plant is constructed and starts supplying energy to the grid. At 
this point, a country is likely to have created a socio-technical regime 
associated with nuclear power, capable of self-reproduction and evolu-
tion during the subsequent phases of technology lifecycle. We provide 
more details in Section 3.2 on how the accomplishment of the formative 
phase is operationalized. 
The formation of a domestic nuclear sector (the dependent variable) 
is affected by many factors which, for the purposes of this analysis, are 
categorized into two groups: technological characteristics and receiving 
context characteristics, as shown in Fig. 1 and discussed in the next two 
sections. Overall, we group all key explanatory factors, identified in the 
existing literature, into four key mechanisms at the technological level 
and three key mechanisms at the context-specific level. 
2.2. Technology-specific mechanisms shaping the introduction of nuclear 
power 
We explore four key technology-specific mechanisms (Table 1) 
which could affect the introduction of nuclear technology. As the tech-
nology evolves over time and becomes more mature, we expect it, 
through accumulated global experience, to be more accessible to 
newcomer countries [8,15]. 
A specific characteristic of nuclear technology is significant safety 
concerns and the possibility of major accidents such as those at Three 
Mile Island (TMI) (USA, 1979), Chernobyl (USSR, 1986) and Fukushima 
(Japan, 2011). Fuhrmann [47] and Gourley & Stulberg [36] find a sta-
tistically significant impact of TMI and Chernobyl on the construction of 
nuclear power plants. On the other hand, Csereklyei et al. [35] did not 
find the accidents to have any delaying effects on nuclear power plant 
construction, but they did find the Chernobyl accident to negatively 
affect how many new power plants were constructed at the global level 
[34]. 
Another feature of nuclear power technology is its close association 
with the pursuit of nuclear weapons [27,48,49]. This association could 
be either enabling, with states that pursue nuclear weapons devoting 
more resources to nuclear technologies, or constraining, with non- 
proliferation concerns slowing down nuclear technology diffusion, 
especially in states geopolitically opposed to the core nuclear technology 
countries. Fuhrman [47] found that neither the presence of nuclear 
weapons nor the ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) correlates with the construction of nuclear power plants. Neu-
mann et al. [37] found that the possession of nuclear warheads increases 
the probability of operating nuclear power plants almost fourfold; this is 
similar to Gourley and Stulberg [36], who found that the possession of 
nuclear weapons had statistically significant effects on the use of civil 
nuclear power during the Cold War era. Jewell [30] observed that 
relatively poorer and smaller economies, such as Pakistan, were able to 
launch nuclear power programs if they were simultaneously pursuing 
the development of nuclear weapons. 
Nuclear power evolves in competition with other electricity gener-
ation technologies. One outcome of this competition is the change in the 
share of different electricity generation technologies over time. The first 
factor in this competition is the economic cost of technologies. Analyses 
of the evolution of costs related to the construction of nuclear power 
reactors present conflicting conclusions [7,23,50]. This is partly because 
the estimation of costs over time and across different markets is chal-
lenging due to the lack of transparent data and the many different 
methodologies used to calculate the economic costs. In the most recent 
study of the International Energy Agency–Nuclear Energy Agency 
(IEA–NEA), the overnight cost for nuclear ranges from 2157 to 6920 
$/kWe, but this was evaluated only for eight countries [51, p. 43]. In 
addition to the wide range of construction costs, nuclear power cost 
estimates are further complicated by cost uncertainties related to 
operating, insurance, decommissioning and waste management. 
Technologies compete not only on economic costs but also on char-
acteristics such as ease of introduction and operation, reliability, emis-
sions, contribution to economic development, and energy security. 
When nuclear was introduced in the post-war period, global electricity 
generation was dominated by hydro, coal, and oil-fired generation. In 
several industrialized countries, nuclear was promoted as a response to 
increasing oil prices to replace imported oil in power generation 
[48,52]. According to Csereklyei et al. [35], higher oil prices (which 
correlate with prices of other fossil fuels, see Fig. A1) led to faster con-
struction of nuclear power plants (see also Markard et al. [27]). 
Moreover, several new electricity generation technologies have 
emerged or expanded and could plausibly have outcompeted nuclear 
power. These include natural gas (enabled by such innovations as long- 
distance pipelines, liquefied natural gas (LNG), and more recently, 
fracking, wind, and solar power (see Fig. A2 in the Appendix). 
Table 1 
Key technology specific mechanisms.  
Technological context Hypotheses 
1. Global experience Accumulated global experience makes nuclear power 
more accessible to newcomer countries 
2. Nuclear accidents Nuclear accidents make nuclear power less attractive to 
newcomer countries 
3. Link with nuclear 
weapons 
Association with nuclear weapons can facilitate 
mobilization of domestic resources for nuclear power in 
countries pursuing nuclear weapons or trigger 




Decline/increase in the competitiveness of other 
technologies makes nuclear power more/less attractive to 
newcomer countries  
Table 2 
Key context specific mechanisms.  
Local Context Hypotheses 
5. Socio-economic 
characteristics 
Countries that experience high demand growth, have a 
large economy size and high income per capita, are not 
major energy exporters, and are politically stable; are 
more likely to introduce nuclear power. 
6. International 
cooperation 
Countries that are politically aligned with and 
economically tied to at least one key nuclear supplier or 
global power (USSR/Russia and USA) are more likely to 
introduce nuclear energy. 
7. Political and 
regulatory regimes 
Countries with a liberalized power market are less likely 
to introduce nuclear energy. The level of democracy 
level could have both positive and negative effects on 
the probability of introducing nuclear energy.  
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2.3. Context-specific mechanisms shaping the introduction of nuclear 
power 
The central mechanism by which the societal context affects the 
introduction of nuclear power is state action [38]. This means that the 
introduction of nuclear power requires a high level of state motivation 
and capacity [30] and therefore countries able to introduce nuclear 
power should have certain characteristics, which we group into the 
following categories: (i) socio-economic characteristics, (ii) interna-
tional cooperation, and (iii) political and regulatory regimes (see also 
Table 2). 
2.3.1. Socio-economic characteristics 
States’ energy policies are motivated by the need to ensure a secure 
supply–demand balance [53]. In particular, high import dependence 
might motivate a state to invest in a ‘quasi-domestic source’ [31]. 
Existing studies do not provide conclusive evidence of how the depen-
dence of energy imports affects the use of nuclear power [35,47,54]. For 
fossil fuel producers, the level of motivation to invest in nuclear power 
might be relatively low, as such states do not experience significant 
energy security concerns. Additionally, some major energy producing 
countries may suffer from the so-called “resource-curse” [55], which 
reduces their capacity to promote complex technological developments. 
Finally, it is not uncommon for major energy producers to subsidize 
domestic electricity [56], which could make non-fossil power sources 
unprofitable for them. 
Energy security concerns may also arise from rapid electricity de-
mand growth [57]. Jewell [30] observed that nuclear power has been 
introduced following extraordinary growth in electricity demand; Cherp 
et al. [31] also showed that the rapid expansion of nuclear power in 
Japan—but not in Germany in the 1990s—is explained by rapid growth 
in electricity demand. Growing electricity demand not only motivates 
states to support nuclear power, but also makes national power markets 
attractive to international investors (Fig. 1). Markard et al. [27] remark 
on high demand growth in emerging economies as potentially stimu-
lating expansion of nuclear power. However, a systematic evaluation of 
the connection between electricity demand growth and nuclear power is 
lacking in the literature. 
Apart from motivation, the ability of states to achieve their goals 
depends on national capacities. Markard et al. [27, p. 3] argued that 
nuclear power is a complex technology ‘which demands skilled labor 
and specific technological and organizational competences’. Wealthier 
economies may find it easy to facilitate the launch of nuclear programs 
[30,49] through, for example, state-funded research and development 
[27] combined with provision of state subsidies for individual nuclear 
plant construction [35,36,47]. Moreover, larger and richer economies 
attract investors, suppliers, and project developers, facilitating diffusion 
of new technologies through ‘market attractiveness’ [32]. Another ca-
pacity variable is political stability, which, according to Jewell [30], 
affects the launch of new nuclear programs, as illustrated by the case of 
Turkey, where political instability has derailed at least four different 
attempts to build a first nuclear power plant from the 1950s onwards 
[58]. It is thus plausible to assume that among the factors facilitating the 
introduction of nuclear power are larger size of the economy, higher 
income and political stability. 
2.3.2. International cooperation 
Nuclear power, like any technology, was introduced first by early 
adopters (the core) and then taken up by latecomers (the rim and pe-
riphery) [7,59,60]. Technological diffusion involves transfer of artifacts 
(e.g., supply of nuclear reactors) and also knowledge (e.g., through 
training of engineers and provision of guidelines to regulators). The 
Table 3 
Independent variables.  
Mechanism Variables Operationalization Notes/Sources 
1. Global experience Cumulative reactor 
starts 
The number of nuclear reactor starts in a given year 
and all preceding years 
IAEA PRIS [79] 
2. Nuclear accidents Occurrence of a major 
nuclear accident 
Binary coding: 1 in the year of the accident + 2 
consecutive years after TMI (1979), Chernobyl 
(1986), Fukushima (2011) 
Own coding/additional specifications similar to Csereklyei [34] 
3. Nuclear weapons Presence of a nuclear 
weapons program 
Binary coding: 1 in all years the year after the nuclear 
weapons program start year 
It is assumed that no new countries started a nuclear weapons program 
post 2006, the year from which the historical data for the exact start 
year of the nuclear program were taken, Jo and Gartzke [81] 
4. Market 
competitiveness 
Oil price (log 2019$) Historical oil price in 2019 $, transformed as a natural 
logarithm 
Taken from the most recent data from BP [92] 
Shares of gas Global shares of gas in electricity generation Calculated based on World Energy Balances IEA data [85] 
Shares of solar and 
wind 
Global shares of solar, and wind in electricity 
generation 
Calculated based on World Energy Balances IEA data [85] 
Shares gas, wind and 
solar 
Global shares of gas, solar, and wind in electricity 
generation 
Calculated based on World Energy Balances IEA data [85] 
5. Socio-economic 
characteristics 
OECD Binary: see section 3.3 for a detailed explanation As a proxy for key national characteristics 
High electricity 
growth 
Binary: 1 if the growth is >2 TWh/y in 3 consecutive 
years 




Binary: 1 if dependence >25%/Binary: 1 if oil exports 
exceed 10% of GDP in a given year 
IEA, calculations based on Cherp et al. [42]/major oil exporter 
categorization taken from Colgan [86] 
Economy size Real GDP in US dollars. 
Transformed as a natural logarithm 
Historical data taken from Gleditsch [88] and more recent data from 
the World Bank [87] 
6. International 
cooperation 
OECD Binary: see section 3.3 for a detailed explanation As a proxy for key international characteristics 
COMECON Binary: 1 for the year a country becomes a COMECON 
member and subsequent years 
As a proxy for key international characteristics 
Aligned with the USA This variable ranges from 1 (complete foreign policy 
similarity) to − 1 (complete dissimilarity) based on 
UN voting data 
Weighted s scores based on the calculations from Chiba et al. [82] and 
Signorino and Ritter [83] 
USSR dissolution Binary (1 after 1991)  
7. Political and 
Regulatory Regime 




Ranges between − 10 (full autocracy) to 10 (full 
democracy)/ Binary: 1 if a severe crisis occurs in the 
preceding five years. 
Marshall and Jaggers [89], update version of PolityV/PITF 
Power market 
liberalization 
Ranges from 0 to 8 from non-liberalized to completely 
liberalized power sector 
Data for developed countries based on Erdogdu [91] and developing 
countries based on Urpelainen and Yang [90]  
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nuclear supply chain is extremely concentrated [61,62], which is also 
reflected in the structure of international nuclear cooperation agree-
ments [63]. Existing studies show that nuclear newcomers have often 
benefited from technological assistance from countries with existing 
nuclear power programs (see e.g., Jewell and Ates [58] on Turkey; Choi 
et al. [64] for South Korea; Price [65] for France; and Smith and Rose 
[66,67] for Japan). Geopolitical considerations affecting the diffusion of 
civil nuclear power have been stressed by many authors [27,61,68]. 
However, a statistically significant link between a country’s position 
within the international system and the introduction of nuclear power 
has not been found in the case of defense pacts with major suppliers [47] 
or trade openness [36]. As early adopters of nuclear energy were 
concentrated in Western Europe, North America, and the USSR we hy-
pothesize that foreign policy alignment with the USA and the USSR 
could be a proxy for easier diffusion of nuclear power. 
2.3.3. Political and regulatory regime 
As a technology relying strongly on state support, nuclear power 
depends on the state’s institutions and politics, not only on its economic 
capacities and geopolitical position. One such characteristic is the level 
of democracy. Advanced democracies have high levels of administrative 
capacity but at the same time might struggle to implement certain pol-
icies in the face of a high number of veto players [69] and competing 
interests. Jasper [70] and Sovacool and Valentine [38] argue that more 
centralized governments, such as France, are more easily able to deploy 
nuclear power, even against citizens’ wishes, than more decentralized 
systems such as the United States. Stirling and Johnstone [21] advance a 
similar argument, namely, that a different “quality of democracy” in the 
UK is responsible for its decision to resume nuclear power plant con-
struction, in contrast to Germany. While Gourley & Stulberg [36] do not 
find the level of democracy to statistically affect whether a country starts 
nuclear power plant construction, a more recent analysis [37] points out 
that democracy makes it less likely for a country to construct its first (but 
not subsequent) nuclear power plants. Csereklyei et al. [35] find that 
democracy accelerates the construction of nuclear power plants, while 
Thurner et al. [71] find that autocracy has an accelerating effect. It has 
been argued that, besides the quality of democracy—and given the 
capital intensity, risks, and long pay-off times of nuclear power - elec-
tricity market liberalization may have made the introduction of nuclear 
power more challenging [27]. We thus also consider the levels of power 
market liberalization in our analysis. 
Climate change mitigation is also mentioned among other political 
factors associated with the uptake of nuclear power [27]. Reframing 
nuclear energy as a sustainable energy technology is however a rela-
tively recent phenomenon [72] that covers only a small part of the 
overall time period considered in this study. Whether framing nuclear 
technology as an important climate mitigation strategy is a relevant 
factor could be explored in more detail by conducting case studies of 
nuclear newcomers (Belarus, Turkey, United Arab Emirates [UAE] and 
Bangladesh). One more factor mentioned by Markard et al. [27] and 
several other authors are social movements [73]. Social movements 
have indeed played a role in some cases such for example the 
Fig. 2. Take-off Sequence of the first sizable (not research) nuclear reactor. Note: Construction start and grid connection of reactors marking the accomplishment of 
the formative phase are based on data from IAEA country profiles. For the four “newcomers” Turkey, Bangladesh, Belarus, and the UAE, years of grid connection are 
current estimations based on IAEA country profiles. The first nuclear reactor in the UAE was connected to the grid in August 2020; the reactor in Belarus started 
commercial operations in March 2021 but has frequent emergency shutdowns. The Figures refer to the information available as of April 2021[80]. 
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referendum in Austria [74], where nuclear program was stopped after a 
nuclear power plant was built. Moreover, a rigorous analysis of social 
opposition to nuclear power highlights the importance of political cir-
cumstances for a social movement to be successful [75]. A more sys-
tematic analysis of social opposition to nuclear power thus deserves a 
separate study, using more fine-grained qualitative methods and case 
studies. 
3. Research design 
3.1. Sample and period selection 
Previous studies on national differences in the use of nuclear energy 
were conducted either only on countries with existing nuclear power 
programs [30,38] or on the maximum possible number of countries 
[36,37,71]. The former studies do not allow the differences between 
countries with and without nuclear energy programs to be analyzed, 
while the latter suffer from incorporating many economies that are too 
small to even accommodate a nuclear power plant. To overcome these 
shortcomings, our sample covers 79 countries including 34 countries 
with nuclear power (see Appendix Table A2) that (i) have an electric 
grid capacity of over 1 GW1 as of 2017, and (ii) have stated an interest in 
developing a nuclear energy program at some point in time, as docu-
mented by the country profiles from the World Nuclear Association [76]. 
This allows us to include only those countries interested in and, at least 
in principle, capable of deploying nuclear power. Our observation 
period starts in 1950, that is, several years before the deployment of the 
first commercial nuclear reactor in the UK (1956), and ends in 2018 with 
the most recent available data on some of the key variables included in 
our analysis (newcomer countries such as Bangladesh, Belarus, Turkey, 
and UAE are included in samples where we use the year of construction 
start as the dependent variable, but not where the dependent variable is 
grid connection (see Fig. 2 and Tables A3 and A4 in the Appendix). 
3.2. Dependent variable 
In our analysis, we use the timing of the first sizable nuclear power 
plant as the dependent variable signaling the completion of the 
formative phase of nuclear power in a particular country. Previous 
studies have defined different thresholds for formative phases of new 
technologies. For example, Grubler et al. [8] proposed 5 %, while Bento 
et al. [59] proposed 2.5% of potential market adopters for a wide range 
of technologies. In a renewable energy context, Cherp et al. [42] pro-
posed 1% of electricity be generated by wind and solar power, while 
Gosens et al. [77] proposed 100 MW of installed wind and solar power 
capacity as thresholds for the end of the formative phase. Nuclear power 
is different in that the relative size of individual plants is typically very 
large, so that the first plant is likely to exceed both 100 MW and 1% of 
national electricity production, especially in smaller countries. On the 
other hand, the complexity of a nuclear power plant and its associated 
supply chains mean that the start of electricity production from the first 
nuclear power plant in most cases signals the presence of the necessary 
technical capacity, investment model, regulations, and other elements of 
a socio-technical regime and is also the completion of all the “mile-
stones” for the introduction of nuclear power as defined by the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) [78]. 
We used the IAEA PRIS database [79] to obtain information on the 
first two reactors established in each country. We used this approach 
because some countries build their first reactor for research or demon-
stration purposes but never proceed with the use of nuclear technology 
in the power sector or delay it significantly. We subsequently compared 
the size of the reactor to other contemporary reactors and assessed the 
time interval between the establishment of the first and second reactor. 
If the first reactor is comparatively small and/or the time interval be-
tween the first and second reactors is very long, we use the year of 
construction or connection of the second reactor as the indicator for 
when the formative phase of nuclear technology was accomplished (see 
Appendix Table A1). 
Example 1. The UK started with a 49 MW plant in 1956 and had built 
a second one (49 MW) already by 1957. We thus considered the first 
reactor built in 1956 as the one marking the accomplishment of the 
formative phase. 
Example 2. Pakistan built its first 90 MW nuclear power plant (NPP) 
in 1972 at a time when much larger reactors were available and a second 
300 MW NPP in 2000. We therefore considered the second reactor, built 
in 2000, as the one marking the establishment of nuclear power. 
Fig. 2 depicts the timing of the construction start as well as the grid 
connection of the reactors that we consider as marking the accom-
plishment of the formative phase. The majority of countries started the 
construction of their first sizable nuclear power plant in the 20-year 
period between 1960 and 1980, but only three countries (China, 
Pakistan, and Romania) connected their first reactors to the grid in the 
20-year period from 1990 to 2010. Sometimes the grid connection of a 
nuclear reactor can experience delays as it is most strikingly depicted by 
the case of Iran, and also by the cases of Brazil, Mexico and China. When 
presenting our results in Section 4, we focus on the year of the grid 
connection, but in the Appendix (Table A4), we also present a sensitivity 
analysis for the year of construction start. 
The information on the year and the capacity of the power plants was 
taken from the country profiles of the IAEA.1 Additionally, we consulted 
the information provided by the World Nuclear Association (WNA) and 
other online resources on (i) territories such as Taiwan or the German 
Democratic Republic (GDR) which are not documented by the IAEA, and 
(ii) on all the countries planning to introduce nuclear power before 
2025. In this way, we identified four countries (“newcomers”) whose 
first nuclear power plant construction occurred as recently as in 2020/ 
2021 (Belarus and the UAE) or is planned in the immediate future 
(Bangladesh and Turkey). 
3.3. Independent variables 
In Table 3 we summarize the variables operationalizing the key 
mechanisms identified in Section 2. For the technology specific mecha-
nisms, we use the cumulative number of NPP construction starts in the 
world for a given year based on the PRIS database as a proxy for the 
global experience [79]. For nuclear accidents, we coded the major ac-
cidents at TMI, USA (1979), Chernobyl, USSR (1986) and Fukushima, 
Japan (2011) as one variable, but, in additional model specifications in 
the Appendix (Table A7) we consider them separately [34]. For nuclear 
weapons development, we used the dataset created by Jo and Gartzke 
[81] which indicates the year a country started pursuing nuclear 
weapons. As a proxy for market competitiveness (see also Section 2.2), 
we look at the oil prices and the sum of shares of the competing tech-
nologies in overall electricity generation. 
When tracing context-specific mechanisms we first used the non- 
overlapping grouping of countries into OECD and COMECON mem-
bers. OECD membership is a characteristic of industrial development, 
democracy, certain regulatory settings, and economic cooperation with 
other OECD members. The OECD was founded in 1961; however, its 
predecessor, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation 
(OEEC) was established in 1948 to run the US-financed Marshall Plan.2 
We thus coded countries as OECD members before 1961 if they were 
either members of the OEEC or active foreign aid donors (USA, Canada). 
We coded the OECD variable starting in the exact year of OECD mem-
bership only after the breakdown of the Soviet Union. We also generated 
a variable which indicates whether a country was a member of the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) during the Cold 
War period. Membership of COMECON signals economic cooperation 
1 https://cnpp.iaea.org/pages/index.htm  
2 http://www.oecd.org/about/history/. 
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and political alignment with the Soviet Union. To gain a more precise 
measurement of external alignment with the dominant suppliers, we 
also included a measurement of foreign policy similarity, which is 
frequently used in quantitative international relations research. Specif-
ically, we used the so-called s-scores [82,83]. This variable ranges from 
1 (complete foreign policy similarity) to − 1 (complete foreign policy 
dissimilarity). 
For electricity demand growth we generated a binary measure and 
coded it as 1 for high demand growth if a country experienced a growth 
of more than 2 TWh/y five years ago (here we combined historical data 
from Mitchell [84] and the most recent data from the IEA [85]); and also 
if a country was high in terms of import dependences, namely, if it 
imported more than 25% of fuels used in electricity generation. In 
additional model specification where we did not include import 
dependence measure (see Appendix Table A3 and A4), we also looked at 
whether a country was an oil producer or not according to the definition 
of oil producer status proposed by Colgan [86]. We measured income 
levels based on the classification by the World Bank [87], historical 
gross domestic product (GDP) based on Gleditsch [88], and the most 
recent World Bank [87] data, which we combined by predicting his-
torical GDP based on values from the World Bank. 
Finally, to assess the general political and regulatory regime, we 
included the levels of democracy [89] based on the most recent data 
from the PolityV project and, alternatively, we also controlled for po-
litical stability based on data from PITF. For the assessment of power 
market liberalization, we combined data from Urpelainen and Yang [90] 
and Erdogdu [91], who measure power market liberalization on a scale 
of 0 to 8, with 0 indicating a lack of any liberalization reforms and 8 
standing for completely liberalized markets. 
3.4. Model specification 
Given the structure of our data (binary dependent variable) and the 
focus on why some countries are able to establish nuclear programs 
earlier than others, we utilize a logistic regression model. Given the 
extensive number of variables that we explore in our analysis, we pre-
sent a generic version of the logistic function that we use to test our 
hypotheses (Equation (1)), where p is the probability that a country c 
will introduce nuclear technology in a year t, conditional on the set of 










= β0 + β1X (2) 
We can see from Eq. (1) that for p (nuclear onset) an increase in X will 
not correspond to β1 (i.e., the effect of β1 depends on the values of X); 
however, in Eq. (2), which is a transformed version of Eq. (1), an in-
crease by one unit in X changes the log odds (the left side of the equa-
tion) by β1. The regression output reports β0 and β1 from Eq. (2), 
therefore, in order to understand how one unit increase in X affects the 
odds, we need to take the natural exponential of the reported co-
efficients (see also James et al.[93]). In our results section we report 
regression coefficients (βs) in both the untransformed as well as in the 
transformed form (odds ratios). 
To account for spatial autocorrelations, we cluster standard errors by 
Fig. 3. Sequence of launching nuclear power programs in different groups of countries. Note: Circles depict each of the 79 countries analyzed, the size of the circle 
reflects the population of the country and the shading reflects the peak share of nuclear power in the national electricity supply (white for countries that no longer 
exist or with no nuclear power and dashed yellow for countries where the first nuclear power plant is expected to become operational between 2020 and 2025). The 
countries are arranged in sequence according to the time of introduction of nuclear power. The horizontal position reflects the proximity of the country to the two 
technological ‘cores’: (a) the USA in the top left-hand corner and (b) the USSR at the bottom right-hand side. The vertical position reflects the attractiveness of 
countries’ markets to nuclear power depending on their size (G20 vs. the rest), the level of income, and the level of fossil fuel exports. The blue arrows show the 
direction of international diffusion of nuclear power from the two primary cores and from the secondary core in China and South Korea. For the introduction of 
nuclear power in Finland see footnote. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.) 
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country. To assess the role of time trends, we use polynomial approxi-
mation of time (including t, t2 and t3) as proposed by Carter and 
Signorino [94] and widely used in applied research of binary events. To 
further ensure the robustness of our results, we perform a range of 
different model specifications which we report in the Appendix, 
including running Cox regressions with our key model specifications 
from the logistic regression (see Appendix Tables A3–A7). 
4. Analysis 
4.1. Qualitative exploration 
Like other technologies [7,32], nuclear power originated in a 
handful of nations known as the ’technology core’: the USA, the UK, 
France and the USSR. Its subsequent diffusion was determined by two 
factors that are well documented for other technologies: the ease of 
diffusion and market attractiveness [32]. Both factors favored the 
largest countries in Europe (Germany and Italy) as well as two other G7 
members: Canada and Japan. The four core countries plus Canada and 
Germany were responsible for equipment supplies to all but one3 of the 
countries that introduced nuclear power before 1998. Moreover, just 
four countries (Canada, Germany, USA and USSR/Russia) supplied the 
first reactors to the majority of other countries. Subsequently, nuclear 
power spread to less industrialized countries outside Europe, once again 
favoring more attractive markets in larger countries (future members of 
the G20) which shows how the size of the economy has been a major 
factor in the introduction of nuclear power [30]. This wave was almost 
complete about 40 years after the initial introduction of nuclear power 
in the first core country. Like other countries in the rim (Canada, Ger-
many), some of the G20 countries developed their own technological 
capabilities to facilitate further diffusion (e.g., Japan, South Korea and 
China) creating what might be called ‘a secondary core’. Countries with 
lower economic capacity such as Iran, Pakistan, Belarus, and UAE 
introduced nuclear power notably later (Fig. 3). 
The trends pertaining to context-specific mechanisms, which we 
identified in Section 2, are depicted in Fig. 4. By looking at the evolution 
of nuclear technology within the group of countries that experienced a 
major electricity demand increase (over 2 TWh based on a 5-year 
moving average) we provide an explanation for the interruption in the 
spatial diffusion of nuclear technology in the 1980–2000 period, as well 
as its recent re-emergence. Fig. 4 shows that by the 1980s nuclear power 
had been introduced into nearly all OECD high-income and COMECON 
countries that had ever experienced high electricity demand growth. 
The only exceptions were fossil fuel exporters such as Australia and 
Norway, as well as politically unstable Turkey. In other words, by the 
early 1990s there were almost no countries in the world that would be 
both motivated to launch nuclear programs and capable of doing so. 
Fig. 4 also illustrates that the number of countries able to accom-
modate large reactors increased after 2000, but mainly among devel-
oping countries and major fossil fuel exporters. The introduction of 
nuclear power into these countries cannot rely on the TIS built around 
OECD members, which, as Markard et al. [27] show, is in decline. 
However, there are signs that another TIS may emerge, dominated 
partly by suppliers such as Russia [63] and partly by countries acquiring 
new capabilities as suppliers, such as China and South Korea. Indeed, 
nuclear programs in three imminent newcomers: Turkey, Bangladesh 
and Belarus, are being supported by Russia, and the fourth one – the UAE 
– by South Korea. This TIS will likely serve the potential markets in 
rapidly growing economies, for example, in Asia, where Markard et al. 
[27] note that nuclear power plants construction shows no sign of 
decline. 
4.2. Quantitative analysis 
To assess which of the trends traced through qualitative evidence 
still hold if we control for other explanatory variables, we perform a 
logistic regression covering the 1950–2018 period for 79 countries and 
exploring the variables linked to the mechanisms, explained in Sections 
2 and 3. Our primary dependent variable is the year of the grid 
connection of the reactor, which we consider to mark the establishment 
of the nuclear technology sector. In the Appendix, we include a sensi-
tivity analysis with start year of the first reactor construction as the 
dependent variable. When presenting our results, we use regression 
coefficient plots [96], which display the regression coefficient as a dot 
and ranges of 90 % confidence intervals. If the confidence interval does 
not contain the zero value (marked by the red line), the results are 
statistically significant at the 10 % statistical significance level. A 
regression coefficient plot is an effective tool for summarizing the results 
and has the advantage of additionally showing the uncertainty of esti-
mations (wide confidence intervals indicate a large range of uncer-
tainty). At the same time, in our visualizations we indicate the odds 
ratios (see Section 3.4) and the statistical significance levels of the key 
results as well as the standard errors (see Appendix Tables A3–A7 for 
more sensitivity analyses and for results in table format). 
Fig. 5A displays the results of bivariate analyses. It serves a diag-
nostic purpose; and it shows the plausibility of operationalization of the 
hypotheses through the proposed variables by indicating the direction of 
effect. Fig. 5B shows correlations between key variables, in particular 
that OECD members have higher incomes (0.35), larger economies 
(0.27), higher levels of democracy (0.63), and are more aligned with the 
USA (0.34), compared with non-OECD countries. The strong correla-
tions between many key variables and the OECD suggest that there are 
not only theoretical, but also methodological, reasons to explore the 
Fig. 4. Characteristics of non-nuclear and nuclear countries (1955–2018). Note: 
The chart depicts the number of countries with demand growth over 2 TWh/ 
year (as a moving average over 5 years) that did build nuclear power plants 
(below the horizontal axis) and those that did not establish a nuclear power 
sector (above the axis). The colors of the bars indicate country groups. Only one 
country inheriting nuclear power plants from each predecessor state is shown: 
Russia (from the USSR), Czechia (from Czechoslovakia) and Slovenia (from 
Yugoslavia). For consistency, the former COMECON states (including the GDR) 
that became nuclear are carried over the year 1991. We defined OECD and 
COMECON members as in the quantitative analysis (see Section 3.3) and 
categorized a country as a major fuel exporter based on World Bank Data, if fuel 
exports presented more than 20 % of a country’s exports in 2018 [95]. G20 
members are categorized for the whole historical period rather than just for the 
period after the formal establishment of G20. 
3 Finland represents a special case, where the first reactor was supplied by the 
Soviet Union with safety and control equipment provided by Siemens (Ger-
many) and Westinghouse (the US). A Swedish-supplied reactor was constructed 
in parallel and connected one year later. 
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effects of OECD membership in a separate model. Here, we try to limit 
the number of binary variables that could possibly strongly overlap and 
we decrease the overall number of variables explored in a single model 
so as to avoid model overfitting [97]. 
For those reasons, we focus on two key model specifications when 
presenting our main results: one showing the combination of techno-
logical variables and OECD versus COMECON membership (Fig. 6A), 
and one showing the combination of technological variables and key 
socio-economic and geo-political characteristics, as well as controls for 
key policy measures (Fig. 6B). 
Fig. 6A is an additional confirmation of the trends that we have 
observed through the qualitative exploration in Section 4.1. The odds of 
countries becoming nuclear are over four times higher for OECD and 
COMECON members than for other countries, when controlling for key 
technological characteristics. Among the key technological character-
istics we find in the Fig. 6A specification that countries pursuing nuclear 
weapons are five times more likely to introduce nuclear energy than 
countries not pursuing nuclear weapons; we also find a minor effect of 
increased oil prices in the model, which includes time effects. Nuclear 
weapons and oil price variables are, however, not statistically significant 
if we focus on a range of more granular socioeconomic characteristics 
rather than on country categorization into OECD and COMECON. One 
possible explanation for the nuclear weapons variable not being statis-
tically significant in the models displayed in Fig. 6B is that this variable 
correlates with the size of the economy. It is plausible to assume that it is 
the size of the economy that drives both the pursuit of nuclear weapons 
and the establishment of nuclear power. 
Among the context-level characteristics, a major growth in elec-
tricity demand (over 2 TWh in the preceding 5 years) increases the odds 
of a state becoming nuclear more than tenfold. As we also show in the 
Appendix, this is, in fact, one of the most robust predictors under various 
model specifications (see Tables A3–A7). Another key driver is the 
availability of domestic fossil fuels. High import dependence increases 
the odds of introducing nuclear energy threefold, while as we show in 
Fig. 4, and in the additional specifications in the Appendix, being a 
major fossil fuel exporter makes the introduction of nuclear energy 
Fig. 6. Main results technology versus context characteristics Note: Each panel displays the regression coefficients as well as the odds ratios in parentheses. Standard 
Errors are indicated in the squared brackets. We always report two different specifications one with standard errors clustered by country but excluding time effects 
(blue) and one including time effects (red). We also present the results of these models and more combinations of different specifications in the Appendix in Table A3. 
(For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.) 
Fig. 5. Bivariate analysis of key variables and a correlation plot of context level variables Note: Panel A displays the regression coefficients from bivariate models for 
the key variables identified in Sections 2 and 3. If the confidence interval does not contain the zero value (marked by the red line), the results are statistically 
significant at the 10 % statistical significance level. Panel B shows simple correlations of the key context variables in a form of a heat plot [98], where darker red 
colors indicate stronger positive correlations and darker blue colors denote stronger negative correlations. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure 
legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.) 
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unlikely. The size of the economy is another key and extremely robust 
predictor of nuclear power introduction traced by many previous 
studies. Larger countries (increasing log GDP by 1 standard deviation), 
are twice as likely to introduce nuclear energy. The alignment with the 
USA (measured as an overlap in foreign policies) might increase the odds 
by 50%, suggesting the importance of being aligned with a key supplier 
but also of a stable foreign policy, given the dual use nature of nuclear 
technology. At the same time, the increasing liberalization of the power 
market makes the introduction of nuclear energy less likely decreasing 
the odds by 50%. 
5. Discussion 
Nuclear power adoption, similarly to the diffusion of other technol-
ogies, has been driven by socio-technical, techno-economic, and politi-
cal mechanisms [33]. The main socio-technical mechanism, technology 
diffusion from core to periphery, has shaped the broad-brushed pattern 
of this transition, while the economic and political context has defined 
the speed and depth of the diffusion. The main conclusion of our analysis 
is that it was primarily the contextual factors rather than the inherent 
characteristics of nuclear power technology that stalled its diffusion to 
more countries. 
Seminal literature identifies the proximity to early adopters as a 
defining factor shaping the spatial diffusion of new technologies 
[32,60]. Our analysis shows that it was not only geographic, but also the 
‘geopolitical’ proximity that determined the diffusion of nuclear power 
from its initial core in the USA, UK and the USSR to other countries. This 
factor can be so well documented for nuclear power precisely because 
there were two independent ‘core’ regions for nuclear power: COME-
CON and the USA and its allies. Western industrialized suppliers sup-
plied primarily to OECD and G20 countries (including communist 
China), whereas the USSR supplied primarily to its COMECON allies (see 
Figs. 3 and 7). The diffusion to smaller and less technologically 
advanced COMECON countries can mainly be explained by their 
geopolitical affinity to the USSR. However, even in this case, geographic 
proximity and economic development played an important role: nuclear 
power never diffused to COMECON members outside of Europe (the 
plans to develop nuclear power in Vietnam and Cuba were not 
successful). The fact that geopolitical connections were not fully decisive 
is also clear from the observation that some developing economies for 
example, Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, India and China introduced 
nuclear power without being strongly linked to either the USSR or the 
USA. 
Our results on the importance of international relations for nuclear 
power are in line with other studies [27,61,63]. By focusing on the 
initial timing of nuclear power introduction we show that this factor 
may be one explanation of the stalling of nuclear diffusion following the 
end of the Cold War in the 1990s. 
Besides international relations, the contextual factors that shaped the 
diffusion of nuclear power included national motivation and capacities 
[30], which can be viewed as aspects of market attractiveness that 
accelerate or delay technology diffusion [32]. National motivation ex-
plains why nuclear power was introduced in countries with high elec-
tricity demand growth that were dependent on imported fuels for 
electricity production. Domestic capacities needed for the construction 
of the first nuclear power plant explain why the initial introduction of 
nuclear power was in wealthy industrialized OECD countries and the 
world’s largest economies. 
It is generally agreed that nuclear technology is more politicized than 
other technologies, given its dual-use nature [61]. Yet in contrast to 
Neumann et al. [37], we find a statistically significant relationship, not 
between the political regime type and the nuclear technology onset, but 
rather between political ties with the main suppliers. There are several 
possible explanations as to why these results differ from those of Neu-
mann et al. [37]. That study uses a comparable dependent variable (i.e., 
a country being in the process of construction of a nuclear power plant in 
a given year) and shows that non-democracies are more likely to 
introduce nuclear power. One variable that Neumann et al. [37] do not 
control for is COMECON membership, which drove the introduction of 
nuclear power in East European non-democracies through the diffusion 
from the USSR. The second variable not controlled for in their analysis is 
the wave of democratization in the world, which unfolded in parallel 
with the saturation of the nuclear markets depicted in Fig. 4 (Section 
4.1). Thus, while it cannot be ruled out that democracy has an effect on 
the introduction of nuclear power, the results of Neuman’s et al. [37] 
may simply reflect the parallel, but unrelated developments of nuclear 
Fig. 7. Suppliers of the first (sizable) commercial 
nuclear reactors that led to completion of the forma-
tive phase 1950–2023. In the first period (before 
1990) countries are depicted in black, in the second 
period (after 1990) in red. Dashed lines indicate 
planned but uncompleted nuclear power plants. Notes: 
Data on nuclear suppliers are from the IAEA country 
nuclear profiles (IAEA 2019). For current projects 
(displayed with a red dotted arrow) data was taken 
from the WNA reports (WNA 2020). *Finland repre-
sents a special case, where the first reactor was sup-
plied by the Soviet Union but additional equipment 
and engineering was supplied by Western companies. 
(For interpretation of the references to colour in this 
figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version 
of this article.)   
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market saturation and growing democratization. 
We also show that the technology characteristics: the experience of 
the global nuclear power industry, the advances made by the main 
competitors (natural gas and new renewables), accidents at nuclear 
power plants, and the association of nuclear power with nuclear 
weapons did not affect the worldwide diffusion of nuclear power as 
much as contextual factors. The association with nuclear weapons is 
widely commented on in the literature and closely entangled with 
geopolitical factors affecting international cooperation, which as we 
show, has been critical for the spread of civil nuclear power. The initial 
technological core of civil nuclear power included the countries that 
possessed nuclear weapons developed during or in the immediate 
aftermath of World War II; this shows the well documented connection 
between early nuclear weapons programs and nuclear power technolo-
gies. It also explains why the less technologically advanced Soviet Union 
adopted nuclear power earlier than the more technologically advanced 
Germany and Italy. Besides this obvious connection, the pursuit of nu-
clear weapons, when controlled for other key contextual variables, was 
not a statistically significant factor in the formation of civil nuclear 
power regimes. Our results are different from Neumann et al. [37] 
because we controlled for the size of the economy (GDP), which in-
creases the likelihood of countries having a nuclear weapon and civil 
nuclear power. The largest economies - USA, USSR, UK, France and later 
China and India - sought superpower status through nuclear weapon 
acquisition and at the same time had the most suitable markets and 
capacities for civil nuclear power. This does not negate the connection 
documented in case studies linking military and civil nuclear power 
research [21], but it stresses the obvious: the pursuit of nuclear tech-
nology for power generation was neither a pre-condition nor a necessary 
consequence of the nuclear weapons programs as, for example, illus-
trated by Italy, Germany, Japan and Canada. At the same time, we agree 
with Neumann et al. [37] that countries with nuclear weapons might 
have an incentive to also continue to sustain their civil nuclear energy 
program. 
6. Conclusions 
Our analysis advances understanding of the role of technology fac-
tors vs. context-specific factors in the global diffusion of market- 
anchored and policy-driven complex energy technologies. We show 
that at the formative phase of nuclear power, context-specific factors 
such as market attractiveness and ease of diffusion, played a more 
prominent role than technology characteristics, such as accumulated 
global experience, major accidents, association with nuclear weapons, 
and the advances made by competitors. Our paper contributes to the 
literature in that it draws lessons from historical studies of technology 
diffusion to inform the feasibility of future energy scenarios [3,4]. 
The main lesson of our analysis is that the suitability of technologies 
for climate mitigation cannot be determined by only analyzing tech-
nology characteristics in isolation from their historical and future 
context. Moreover, our study focuses on different characteristics of the 
context at both international and national levels, some unchangeable, 
some dynamic, and some susceptible to intervention. 
The first group includes immutable country characteristics such as 
the size of the economy, the income level, electricity demand growth, 
and dependence on imported fuels. These cannot easily be changed by 
policy interventions, but some can evolve over time. For example, in the 
future the number of sufficiently large and growing economies may 
increase, enabling the introduction of nuclear power. The second group 
includes state policies. Adoption of nuclear power, like any other major 
energy technology, requires state involvement ranging from appropriate 
legislation and regulation to financial support [99]. For example, 
broader energy policy such as liberalization of electricity markets has a 
negative effect on the introduction of nuclear technology. Our study 
indicates that to enable the uptake of capital-intensive market-anchored 
technologies like nuclear power (e.g., carbon capture and storage 
[CCS]), liberalized electricity markets should, to some degree, be sup-
ported by additional policies to protect investors [100]. The third group 
of factors encompasses international cooperation. Very few countries 
were able to build their first nuclear reactor on their own and that may 
also be the case for other complex and expensive energy technologies. In 
the same way as COMECON and the corresponding cooperation between 
the USA and its allies enabled the introduction of nuclear power in 
almost every suitable market in the 1960s-1980s, similarly strong in-
ternational cooperation might be needed for the global energy transition 
of the 21st century. 
Our study has several limitations. Though we seek to conceptually 
separate technology-specific from context-specific factors, in reality 
there is a strong interplay between the two. For example, declining 
electricity demand in the core market (a contextual factor) may have 
weakened the global nuclear industry (a technology factor), thus 
reducing its ability to invest in new markets, and this, in turn, slowed 
down innovation in the sector. Second, in common with many studies 
that include quantitative analysis, ours does not fully capture variables 
that are difficult to consistently observe across many countries over a 
long time period. For example, the expectation of a stronger role for 
renewables may have played a role in energy planning already in the 
1980s, long before wind and solar power started to generate notable 
shares of electricity. For the same reason, we were unable to explore the 
role of ideological factors that might have provided additional expla-
nations as to why some countries with sufficient capacity did not 
introduce nuclear energy. The final limitation is that we focus only on 
the introduction of the first reactor. However, it is also important to 
understand what shaped the subsequent growth, stagnation, or decline 
of national nuclear power sectors, including the reasons why various 
countries took decisions to discontinue nuclear power, sometimes, as in 
case of Austria, even before their first newly built reactor was connected. 
Despite these limitations, our study exemplifies how theories of 
spatial technology diffusion and technology life-cycle, particularly with 
respect to the formative phase of new energy technologies, can be 
combined with economic and political theories to understand world-
wide patterns of technology adoption. This kind of research into tech-
nology adoption in a heterogenous world should be extended beyond 
nuclear power, in particular to more ‘granular’ [14] and ‘footloose’ [43] 
technologies, to advance understanding of the feasibility of various 
climate mitigation pathways. 
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Appendix A   
Fig. A2. Historical technology shares in electricity generation Note: Fig. A2 shows the growth of gas shares in electricity generation post 1995 and the uptake of 
renewables around 2005. Source: IEA (2017). World energy balances, IEA World Energy Statistics and Balances (database), https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00512-en. 
Fig. A1. Historical fossil fuel price trends Note: Fig. A1 demonstrates that coal and gas prices follow similar trends as oil prices for available historical data. Source: 
Data is based on BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2020: http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview. 
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Table A1 
Years of the first and second NPP grid connection and the proposed take-off year. Table A1 displays the information about the first two reactors that were used to select 
the reactor that marks the “take-off” or the accomplishment of the formative phase of nuclear technology. In our additional analyses we also included the year of 
construction start for the year which we consider to mark the take-off.  
Country Year (capacity) Take-off year (grid connection) Take-off year (construction start)  
First NPP Second NPP   
UK 1956 (49 MW) 1957 (49 MW) 1956 1953 
US 1957 (24 MW) 1957 (60 MW) 1957 1956 
France 1959 (39 MW) 1960 (40 MW) 1959 1955 
Italy 1964 (303 MW) 1965 (260 MW) 1964 1959 
Soviet Union 1954 (5 MW) 1964 (299 MW) 1964 1957 
West Germany 1962 (15 MW) 1966 (114 MW) 1966 1960 
East Germany 1966 (62 MW) 1974 (408 MW) 1966 1960 
Japan 1965 (12 MW) 1966 (137 MW) 1966 1961 
Canada 1962 (22 MW) 1968 (206 MW) 1968 1960 
India 1969 (300 MW) 1973 (90 MW) 1969 1964 
Spain 1969 (141 MW) 1971 (446 MW) 1969 1964 
Switzerland 1969 (365 MW) 1972 (365 MW) 1969 1965 
Sweden 1964 (10 MW) 1972 (473 MW) 1972 1966 
Netherlands 1969 (55 MW) 1973 (482 MW) 1973 1969 
Argentina 1974 (340 MW) 1984 (600 MW) 1974 1968 
Bulgaria 1974 (408 MW) 1975 (408 MW) 1974 1970 
Belgium 1962 (10 MW) 1975 (1828 MW) 1975 1970 
Finland 1977 (507 MW) 1978 (880 MW) 1977 1971 
South Korea 1978 (576 MW) 1983 (661 MW) 1978 1972 
Taiwan 1981 (1208 MW) 1982 (1902 MW) 1981 1975 
Czechoslovakia 1972 (93 MW) 1980 (408 MW) 1980 1972 
Hungary 1983 (470 MW) 1984 (473 MW) 1983 1974 
Yugoslavia 1983 (688 MW)  1983 1975 
South Africa 1984 (930 MW) 1985 (930 MW) 1984 1976 
Brazil 1985 (626 MW) 2001 (1275 MW) 1985 1971 
Mexico 1990 (777 MW) 1995 (775 MW) 1990 1976 
China 1994 (2186 MW) 2002 (2237 MW) 1994 1987 
Romania 1996 (650 MW) 2007 (650 MW) 1996 1982 
Pakistan 1972 (90 MW) 2000 (300 MW) 2000 1993 
Iran 2013 (915 MW)  2013 1975 
Projected take-off     
Belarus 2020 (1110 MW) 2020 (1110 MW) 2020 2013 
UAE 2020 (5380 MW) 2020 (1345 MW) 2020 2012 
Bangladesh 2023 (1200 MW) 2024 (1200 MW) 2023 2017 
Turkey 2023 (1200 MW) 2024 (1200 MW) 2023 2018 
Source: IAEA country profiles and WNA country reports (IAEA 2019; WNA, 2020). 
Table A2 
Sample overview 1950–2018 Table A2 provides an overview of countries that were included in the sample and the year of when they entered the sample (many 
countries were created in the process of decolonization or the breakdown of the Soviet Union).  
Countries which operate or have operated sizeable commercial nuclear power plants Countries which have not operated commercial nuclear power plants 
Argentina (1950), Bangladesh (1971), Belarus (1991), Belgium (1950), Brazil (1950), 
Bulgaria (1950), Canada (1950), Chile (1950), China (1950), Czechoslovakia (1950), 
France (1950), German Democratic Republic/East Germany (1954), German Federal 
Republic/West Germany (1950), Hungary (1950), India (1950), Iran (1950), Italy 
(1950), Japan (1950), Mexico (1950), Netherlands (1950), Pakistan (1950), Romania 
(1950), South Africa (1950), South Korea (1950), Soviet Union (1950), Spain (1950), 
Sweden (1950), Switzerland (1950), Taiwan (1950), Turkey (1950), United Arab 
Emirates (1971), United Kingdom (1950), United States (1950), Yugoslavia (1950) 
Algeria (1962), Australia (1950), Austria (1955), Azerbaijan (1991), Bahrain (1971), 
Cuba (1950), Denmark (1950), Ecuador (1950), Egypt (1950), Finland (1950), Georgia 
(1991), Ghana (1957), Greece (1950), Indonesia (1950), Ireland (1950), Israel (1950), 
Jordan (1950), Kazakhstan (1991), Kuwait (1961), Laos (1953), Libya (1951), Malaysia 
(1957), Morocco (1956), Myanmar (1950), New Zealand (1950), Nigeria (1960), North 
Korea (1950), Norway (1950), Oman (1971), Paraguay (1950), Peru (1950), Philippines 
(1950), Poland (1950), Portugal (1950), Qatar (1971), Saudi Arabia (1950), Singapore 
(1965), Sri Lanka (1950), Sudan (1956), Syria (1950), Thailand (1950), Tunisia (1956), 
Uzbekistan (1991), Venezuela (1950), Vietnam (1954)  
E. Brutschin et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
Energy Research & Social Science 80 (2021) 102221
14
Table A3 
Reporting the results from Fig. 6 and additional specifications. Note: Table A3 shows the results that are reported in Fig. 6A – Model (1) and Fig. 6B – Model (2) with 
time trends. Model (3) additionally includes “High income” and a binary measure of the breakdown of the USSR. Model (4) includes the variable “oil exporter” instead 
of “import dependence”. Model (5) looks at the possible effect of the variable “state failure” instead of the variable “democracy”.  
DV: grid connection (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Cumulative reactor starts − 0.00844 (0.00827) 0.000815 (0.00926) − 0.00505 (0.00984) − 0.00487 (0.00983) − 0.00738 (0.00986) 
Major nuclear accidents − 0.931 (0.823) − 0.914 (0.807) − 1.007 (0.809) − 1.021 (0.807) − 1.015 (0.816) 
Shares gas and winsol 0.0621 (0.292) 0.0855 (0.287) − 0.0807 (0.304) − 0.115 (0.307) − 0.160 (0.304) 
Oil price (log 2019$) 0.542* (0.299) 0.200 (0.345) 0.153 (0.346) 0.176 (0.331) 0.134 (0.344) 
Nuclear weapons 1.638*** (0.547) 0.125 (0.714) 0.108 (0.693) − 0.0668 (0.690) 0.149 (0.676) 
OECD member 1.520*** (0.434)     
COMECON 1.487*** (0.533)     
Electricity demand growth  2.600*** (0.698) 2.506*** (0.649) 2.385*** (0.649) 2.069*** (0.650) 
Import dependence  1.079*** (0.411) 0.986** (0.395)   
Economy size  0.854*** (0.243) 0.897*** (0.240) 0.695*** (0.219) 0.780*** (0.240) 
Democracy level (standardized)  − 0.0300 (0.272) 0.0672 (0.273) 0.147 (0.269)  
Aligned with the USA (standardized)  0.412** (0.207) 0.430* (0.231) 0.416* (0.239) 0.431* (0.229) 
Power market liberalisation (standardized)  − 0.826* (0.478) − 0.783 (0.491) − 0.789* (0.475) − 0.753* (0.456) 
High income (WB)   − 0.677 (0.435) − 0.693 (0.434) − 0.518 (0.423) 
USSR   − 1.386 (1.127) − 1.588 (1.146) − 1.737 (1.219) 
Oil exporter    0 (.) − 1.518 (0.990) 
State Failure (5 years)     − 0.937 (0.959) 
Constant − 17143.8*** (5112.0) 109.2 (367.7) − 180.9 (407.5) − 202.0 (406.7) − 290.3 (405.2) 
Observations 3781 3651 3651 3141 3750 
AIC 326.5 270.5 271.6 266.2 282.4 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Table A4 
Reporting the results from Table A3 but looking at construction start as the dependent variable Note: Table A4 shows same model specification as in A3. The major 
differences are highlighted in bold. The share of gas and wind + solar energy in electricity generation are now positive and statistically significant, nuclear accidents 
are also statistically significant and positive, while power market liberalization is more robust and statistically significant in all model specifications as compared to the 
specification where the year of grid connection is taken.  
DV: construction start (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Cumulative reactor starts 0.00211 (0.34) 0.00299 (0.44) 0.00139 (0.17) 0.00176 (0.22) 0.00261 (0.33) 
Major nuclear accidents − 0.0165 (− 0.02) 0.210 (0.25) 0.196 (0.24) 0.144 (0.17) 0.117 (0.14) 
Shares gas and winsol 0.578** (2.57) 0.485** (2.36) 0.452** (2.05) 0.447** (2.05) 0.466** (2.15) 
Oil price (log 2019$) (standardized) 0.410 (0.85) 0.116 (0.27) 0.140 (0.34) 0.129 (0.31) 0.105 (0.25) 
Nuclear weapons 2.838*** (6.27) 1.951*** (3.35) 1.873*** (3.14) 1.830*** (2.97) 1.988*** (3.42) 
OECD member 1.459*** (3.38)     
COMECON 2.024*** (5.09)     
Electricity demand growth  2.213*** (4.26) 2.199*** (4.25) 2.008*** (3.87) 2.062*** (4.08) 
Import dependence  1.054** (2.44) 1.010** (2.32)   
Economy size (standardized)  0.698** (2.50) 0.741*** (2.68) 0.572** (2.33) 0.608** (2.52) 
Democracy level (standardized)  − 0.327 (− 1.50) − 0.286 (− 1.28) − 0.226 (− 0.97)  
Aligned with the USA (standardized)  0.758*** (3.11) 0.779*** (3.10) 0.750*** (3.03) 0.562** (2.40) 
Power market liberalisation (standardized)  − 0.820*** (− 3.22) − 0.808*** (− 2.84) − 0.749*** (− 2.71) − 0.751** (− 2.54) 
High income (WB)   − 0.454 (− 0.85) − 0.522 (− 1.03) − 0.354 (− 0.76) 
USSR   − 0.537 (− 0.35) − 0.794 (− 0.50) − 0.846 (− 0.55) 
Oil exporter    − 1.120 (− 1.02) − 0.579 (− 0.78) 
State failure (5 years)     0.462 (0.82) 
Constant − 10001.5*** (− 3.22) 347.0 (1.31) 274.4 (0.84) 270.2 (0.84) 299.0 (0.95) 
Observations 3549 3427 3427 3427 3519 
AIC 327.6 288.3 291.4 294.3 301.5 
t statistics in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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